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• These slides are based on a talk that Michael Spagat gave at 
CSIS on November 3, 2005.
• This version has been further developed together with Jorge 
Restrepo and with research assistance from Nicolás Suárez.
• This is still work in progress and subject to change.  
• Comments are welcome: 
• M.Spagat@rhul.ac.uk
• jorge.restrepo@cerac.org.co
• Our team maintains a database on the Colombian conflict, 1988 -
June 2005.
• This dataset has more than 21,000 events.
• We include only clear conflict events, requiring each event to 
have a military effect and to reflect a group action.
• The next slide shows the team that maintains the database at 
CERAC, a Bogotá think tank.
• Below commentary will follow each technical slide.
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Portfolio of Attacks by Guerrilla Groups
Massacre
2% Incursion
8%
Check point
20%
Mass kidnapping
1%
Infrastructure
15%
Means of transport
12%
Bombing
9%
Ambush
8%
Mine explosion
3%
Other
22%
1988-2004
Source: CERAC Colombian Conflict Database, 2005
• Roughly half of all guerrilla attacks, including infrastructure 
attacks and attacks on means of transport, seem aimed mainly at 
disrupting the economy.
• This suggests that the guerrillas are not, as is often suggested, 
just interested in getting rich off drugs. They really do seem to 
aim for political power, local power in the short run and national 
power in the long run.
• Bombings are important because they account for most civilian 
injuries in the conflict.
• Massacres, killing at least four defenseless people in one event, 
have high impact but are a small fraction of all guerrilla attacks.
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• Paramilitary attacks have consisted overwhelmingly of 
massacres and other attacks on civilian objectives.
• In the past it has been explicit paramilitary strategy to kill civilian 
whom the paramilitaries presume might be helping the guerrillas.
• However, below we will see that in 2005 the paramilitaries shifted 
toward killing people in ones and twos rather than in massacres.
Total Killings in Attacks by Perpetrator,
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• This pie chart covers only attacks because these are one-sided 
so attribution is unambiguous.  In clashes between two groups 
we seldom can determine who is responsible for civilian 
casualties.
• The paramilitaries have killed more civilians over the years than 
the guerrillas have.
• The difference between paramilitary and guerrilla killing of 
civilians has been even bigger since 1998.
Total Civilian Injuries in Attacks by Perpetrator,
1988 - June 30 2005
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• The guerrillas cause the overwhelming majority of injuries to 
civilians.
• These injuries come mainly in bombings, i.e., in a terrorist 
campaign. 
• The paramilitaries injure very few people because they typically
shoot people at short range in massacres.
Population Density and Civilians Killed in Paramilitary Massacres,
1988 - June 30 2005
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Civilians killed in paramilitary massacres Population projections for 2005
Source: CERAC Colombian Conflict Database, 2005
• The two curves are “cumulative distribution functions”, read as 
follows:
• On the horizontal axis are population densities, i.e., number of
people per square kilometre, given by municipality of which there 
are about 1,100 in Colombia.
• Each point on the green curve gives the fraction of the population 
living in municipalities of that population density or less.
• Each point on the yellow curve gives the fraction of all civilians 
who were killed in paramilitary massacres who were living in 
municipalities of that population density or less.
• Only about 20% of the population lives in municipalities with only 
50 people per square kilometre or less but these municipalities 
account for more than 50% of the civilians killed in paramilitary 
massacres.
• The 50% of the population living in municipalities of less than 
350 people per square kilometre account for about 90% of all 
civilians massacred by paramilitaries.
• To summarize, paramilitary massacres occur primarily in isolated
rural areas.
Population Density and Civilians Killed in Guerrilla Massacres,
1988 - June 30 2005
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Source: CERAC Colombian Conflict Database, 2005
• Read the slide on guerrilla massacres in the same way as the 
one on paramilitary massacres.
• It shows the same general pattern but even more extreme.
• A full 2/3 or all civilians killed in guerrilla massacres were living in 
municipalities with population density of 50 people per square 
kilometre or less.
Population Density and Civilians Injured in Guerrilla Bombings,
1988 - June 30 2005
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Civilians injured in guerrilla bombings Population projections for 2005
Source: CERAC Colombian Conflict Database, 2005
• Read the slide on civilian injuries in guerrilla bombings in the
same way as the massacre slides.
• It shows a very different pattern.  
• There is a slightly elevated risk in low-density municipalities but 
also big risks in Colombia’s biggest cities.
• Important note.  All graphs that follow are quarterly “smoothed”
graphs.  
• This means that the number assigned to every quarter is the sum 
of the raw numbers for the last four quarters.  Hence the last 
point in each curve (2nd quarter of 2005) is the sum of the 
numbers for the last two quarters of 2004 and the first two 
quarters of 2005.
• This technique makes the pictures easier to read than the raw 
ones which bounce around a lot and sometimes have lots of 
curve crossings.  However, we will post the raw pictures soon.
• The maps below are not smoothed.
Combatants and Civilians Killed by Quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• We find that there have always been more combatants killed 
than civilians killed in the Colombian conflict.
• Note though that we are talking about the conflict, narrowly 
defined.  Of course, the overwhelming majority of homicides in 
Colombia are of civilians. Killings directly related with the conflict 
account for 10-15% of total homicides in the country.
• Also there are other forms of victimization including kidnapping
and forced displacement that affect civilians almost exclusively.
• This finding is consistent with those in “The Human Security 
Report 2005” that just came out.
• More importantly, there are dramatic dynamics in the killing of 
civilians.
• There was a sharp drop that began just before Uribe took office.
• But now there is a sharp rise that is, in fact, muffled by the 
smoothing technique.
• Civilian killings in the first half of 2005 are only about 10% below 
the rate in the last year before Uribe took power.

• Note that at the end of this document there are two maps 
that locate the geographical terms we use below.
• This pair of maps shows where the emerging pockets of civilian 
killing are located.
• Notable trouble spots are: 
• Montes de María region.
• Western side of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.
• South of the Atlántico department in the Caribbean plains.
• Intensification of civilian killings in:
• The east of Antioquia department.
• The middle Cauca river valley.
• And around the city of Buenaventura (port on the Pacific 
coast).
• A less concentrated increase of activity in:
• Cauca department.
• North of the Nariño department.
• The north of Meta department.
• Along the Venezuelan border.
• Along the Ecuadorian border, to a lesser extent.
• An emerging trouble spot in the east of the Magdalena
department towards Bolívar and Atlántico departments.

• In the second half of 2004 there were many guerrillas killed 
during the government’s well know, and US supported, southern 
offensive known as Plan Patriota, but officially called Operación 
JM.
• There is considerably less killing of guerrillas recorded in the
south in the first half of 2005.  Probably this reflects a 
combination of dispersal of guerrillas who took a beating in their 
rearguard and a need for the Colombian military to regroup after
taking their own casualties and being hit hard with jungle 
diseases to which the guerrillas have developed resistance over 
the years.  Also, we believe that a shift in the location of killings 
of guerrillas into the deep jungle may have increased the 
likelihood of our data undercounting these killings.
• There was a perceptible increase in killings of guerrillas around 
the Sierra Nevada and Serranía del Perijá mountains way up 
north.

• Killings of government forces increased notably along both the 
Ecuadorian and Venezuelan borders in the first half of 2005.  
• The maps suggest that the guerrillas are using both of these 
borders more actively in 2005 than they were in 2004 and that 
the government is hamstrung by its inability to pursue across 
them.
• A reduction in government casualties in the east and southeast 
of Antioquia, showing a government improvement there, but a 
deterioration in the north and northwest of this department.
• But things are much worse for the government further down the 
Cordillera Central (the mid mountain range of the Colombian 
Andes), especially in the Cauca region.
• There is a significant increase in government casualties in the 
area to the east of the Urabá gulf, along the cordilleras of San 
Jerónimo and Abibe.

• There were very few killings of paramilitaries in the first half of 
2005 as they negotiated their disarmament and demobilization. 
• In the second half of 2004 there were a significant number of 
paramilitaries killed in two well-defined clusters. 
• The first one, at the Cañón de las Garrapatas, continues 
during 2005, and is a serious trouble spot in which rival 
paramilitary and the guerrilla groups are fighting for control 
over narcotics crops.
• The second one, disappearing in 2005, corresponds to the 
fighting between rival paramilitary groups in the Llanos 
Orientales, in particular fighting between the groups of 
“Martín Llanos” and “Miguel Arrroyave”. There were also 
some clashes between government forces and 
paramilitaries in that area, in which the government 
prevailed.
People injured by group by quarters
1988 - June 30 2005
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• The injury information is necessarily not as good as the killing
information.
• In particular, we have very little information on injuries to 
guerrillas and paramilitaries because these groups are generally
able to evacuated their injured before they are counted.
• The information on civilians and government forces is much 
better but there are still problems in defining injuries and 
diseases do not count although they are quite similar to injuries.
• Still the last slide does show a big spike in civilian injuries 
peaking in 2002 and then abating.

• The green curve in the above picture gives the ratio of 
government forces killed to guerrillas killed.  It shows enormous 
improvement over the last five years before turning around in 
2005.
• The other curve (referring to the right axis) shows killings by the 
paramilitaries which shows its own dramatic movement.
• The movement of the two curves shows that paramilitary activity 
tend to increase during periods when the government does not 
contains the guerrillas well and vice versa.
• In other words, paramilitary activity has substituted for 
government success over the years and this pattern even seems 
to continue into 2005.
Government Guerrilla Clashes by Quarters
1988 - June 30 2005
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• The number of clashes between the government and the 
guerrillas is very high, although it has been falling from its peak 
of 2003.
• As a rule, lots of clashing is good for government forces and bad 
for the guerrillas, as the government normally gets the better of 
these encounters.  The guerrillas tend to prefer (unopposed) 
attacks. 

• There is a common misperception that the government has 
concentrated almost exclusively on its southern offensive, 
neglecting other areas.
• However, the maps above show many different areas all over the 
country where government forces have been clashing with the 
guerrillas in a sustained manner. A “retreat” and a counter 
offensive by the guerrilla never materialized. 
• There are two big concentrations in the north (Montes de María
and Sierra Nevada) and many clashes in the east of Antioquia, 
and the serranías in the inland lowlands/savannahs of the 
Caribbean coast: Serranía de San Jerónimo, Ayapel, San 
Jacinto and San Lucas.
• There were significantly fewer clashes in the south in the first half 
of 2005 compared to the second half of 2004, although some of 
these were actually highly publicized as the FARC tried to mount
long duration attacks at some Cauca, Nariño and Putumayo
towns (e.g., Toribío) and were able to inflict  losses on 
government forces during those events.
• The next slide shows the size distribution of casualties of 
government forces in encounters with the FARC (clashes and 
attacks).  It shows a shift toward big-casualty events in 2005.
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Source: CERAC Colombian Conflict Database, 2005
Number of Guerrilla Attacks by Quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• Still, the number of guerrilla attacks has dropped precipitously
under Uribe.
• This drop continued in the first half of 2005 but the change is 
hardly noticeable.
• Today attacks are close to their average historical level. 
• Rather than a retreat and a counter offensive, in attacking terms, 
the guerrillas came down from a historical high and remain at 
their operational average.

• Guerrilla attacks have been in many locations.  There seems to 
be a misperception that this is a new phenomenon but this has 
long be true. In fact, the spreading of attacks has been a long-
standing guerrilla tactic.
• The Ecuadorian border has emerged as a major attacking focus 
for the FARC.
• The Venezuelan border is also a big problem although perhaps 
slightly less so in 2005 compared to 2004.
• There have been numerous attacks concentrated on the low 
altitude serranías of the Caribbean savannahs. The paramilitary 
presence and concentration of forces for demobilization tend to 
be located in the low-level savannahs and not in these isolated 
mountain ranges so this activity might reflect guerrilla attempts of 
fill vacuums left by demobilizing paramilitaries. This could also be 
a by-product of a strategy of the government forces scale these 
mountains in pursuit of the guerrillas. We are unable to adjudicate 
between those hypotheses.
Initiative and responsiveness by quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• We give two measures of the performance of the government 
forces above.
• “Initiative” gives (on the left axis) the fraction of government-
guerrilla clashes that are not tied to a guerrilla attack on the
same day in the same place.  The idea is to measure the degree 
to which the government forces are seeking out the guerrillas 
and engaging them rather than waiting for the guerrillas to make
a first move.
• Initiative has been moving up steadily in recent years.
• Moreover, it is possible that we have underestimated initiative in 
recent months due to possibly incomplete information on 
government activity Operación JM in the souther jungles.
• “Responsiveness” gives (on the right axis) the fraction of guerrilla 
attacks that draw a same-day, same-place response from 
government forces.  The idea is to measure the extent to which 
the government is able to react to and punish guerrilla actions.
• We find responsiveness to be relatively steady although it drops
in recent quarters.
• We think responsiveness can be too high as might have been 
the case around the beginning of 1996 when unusually high 
responsiveness and low initiative could have indicated an 
excessively defensive posture.
Number of Paramilitary Attacks by Quarters
1988 - June 30 2005
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• The drop and rise in the number of paramilitary attacks under 
Uribe is stunning as is the rise preceding Uribe.
• These changes must be viewed within the context of the next few 
slides.


• The maps show that the takeoff in paramilitary activity is 
happening in many different places.  
• We find a reactivation of paramilitary attacks and killings in 2005 
in the Montes de María, in the south of Atlántico, in the east of 
Antioquia, in the west of Cundinamarca, in the Magdalena Medio
region, in Meta, in Arauca and in the savannahs of Córdoba.
• This cannot be attributed to the few paramilitary groups that are 
not negotiating disarmament and demobilization with the 
government. On the contrary, this corresponds mostly with those 
areas where the negotiating groups are located.
Civilians Killed in Paramilitary Massacres by Quarters
1988 - June 30 2005
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• This picture shows that the surge in paramilitary attacks does not 
take the form of massacres, which by definition require that four 
people be killed.
• As the next slide shows, in the vast majority of these events the 
paramilitaries are killing one or two people at a time.
• This activity has gone on largely below the radar screen.
Size Distribution of Killings by Paramilitaries
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Number of ELN Clashes and Attacks by Quarters
1988 - June 30 2005
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• ELN attacks have dropped very far in recent years but now seem 
to be bottoming out.
• Government-ELN clashes have not dropped as sharply as the 
government has maintainded pressure on the ELN, keeping the 
clash count around historical averages.
Number of Government Forces and Guerrillas Killed by Quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• The gap between killings of guerrillas and killings of government 
forces has shrunk, but still looks rather wide by historical 
standards.
• But the unsmoothed picture looks much worse; the ratio of 
guerrillas killed to government forces killed closed to 1.4 in the 
second quarter of 2005.  
• On the other hand, the smoothing procedure is meant to iron out 
quarter-to-quarter fluctuation so it is probably a better indicator 
the current situation than the unsmoothed picture.
• Moreover, the shift in part reflects the scope of the government’s 
ambition recently, directly challenging FARC strongholds in the 
south.
Killings by Group in Guerrilla Events by Quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• The next set of pictures (starting above) includes both clashes 
and attacks. First we examine all clashes and attacks involving 
the guerrillas.
• The guerrillas are not behind the increase in killings of civilians.
• The guerrillas are fighting less with the paramilitaries than they 
were a few years ago. In fact, the paramilitaries essentially 
ceased to be an anti-insurgent clashing force in the conflict 
beginning around 2002.
• As mentioned above the guerrilla/government killing ratio is 
declining.
Killings by Group in Government Events by Quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• There was an increase in government killings of civilians in the
first half of 2005. This trend, although from a very low level, is 
worrisome, and the government needs to study in detail where 
these are occurring and why.
• This government has actually been fighting with the 
paramilitaries more than previous ones have.
Killings by Group in Paramilitary Events by Quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• Civilians have been the main victims in paramilitary events.  
• Remarkably, the paramilitaries themselves are the second 
victims. 
• This indicates that the paramilitaries are vulnerable to military 
pressure.
Killings by Group in Paramilitary Clashes by Quarter
1988 - June 30 2005
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• The above slide shows what bad fighters the paramilitaries are.
• The guerrillas have generally pushed them around except in a 
few areas.
Big Picture
• Most indicators are moving in the wrong direction although their
levels are generally still good compared to the recent past.
• The conflict is still hot, but not getting hotter.
• Paramilitary behavior has taken a sharp turn for the worse.
• The ratio of guerrillas killed to government forces killed has been 
declining although, averaging over the last year, it is still high.
• The initiative of government forces shows steady improvement.
• There are new trouble spots and a general change in the 
geography of the conflict 
Big Picture
• In particular, the eastern Antioquia region, Arauca, the Montes 
de María and the east of the Sierra Nevada have consolidated as 
problematic regions; while the Cañón de las Garrapatas, Meta
and Cauca departments appear as emerging problematic 
regions.
• Killing of civilians by government forces increased over the last 
six months.
• Problems have been increasing along the Venezuelan and 
Ecuadorian borders.

